Since the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, rapidly transformed into an indirect confrontation between Moscow and the collective West, a core assumption has guided much of European and Western strategic thinking: Russia would not be able to endure a prolonged conflict. According to this view, the Russian economy, hit by unprecedented sanctions, isolated from Western financial markets and deprived of access to advanced technologies, would soon collapse, forcing the Kremlin to scale back its military and geopolitical ambitions.
This assumption, however, is proving increasingly fragile when confronted with reality. Not only has Russia demonstrated a level of economic resilience far greater than expected, but the global economic and financial architecture has changed profoundly compared to previous historical crises. In particular, China’s economic and financial support for Moscow represents a structural factor that Western policymakers appear to have underestimated, continuing instead to rely on analytical frameworks shaped by a bygone unipolar era.
The belief that an orchestrated collapse in oil prices could “bleed” Russian public finances and break the Kremlin’s capacity to resist now seems far less convincing. In a multipolar world characterized by alternative markets, non-Western currencies and diversified supply chains, economic warfare no longer produces the automatic outcomes it once did.
This article examines in depth the strategic calculations of Europe and the West regarding Russia’s presumed inability to sustain a long-term confrontation, contrasting them with the realities of a transforming international system and with the decisive role played by China in providing Moscow with an economic and financial safety net capable of sustaining it even in the event of deliberate shocks to global energy prices.
Western Expectations and the Predicted Collapse of the Russian Economy
From the earliest stages of the conflict, Western governments, institutions and analysts repeatedly emphasized a central narrative: the Russian economy would not withstand the pressure. The sanctions imposed on Moscow were described as the harshest ever applied to a major power, explicitly designed to paralyze the financial system, cripple industry, drain state revenues and generate internal discontent severe enough to undermine political stability.
Europe, in particular, bet heavily on the idea that Russia’s dependence on energy exports represented a decisive vulnerability. By reducing or eliminating imports of Russian gas and oil and by imposing price caps, Western policymakers assumed they could deprive the Kremlin of its primary source of fiscal revenue, forcing a rapid strategic retreat.
These calculations were largely based on historical precedents, especially the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, when falling oil prices contributed significantly to Moscow’s financial crisis. Yet applying the same logic to contemporary Russia ignores the profound structural differences between the Soviet system and the Russian Federation of the twenty-first century.
Russia Today Is Not the Soviet Union
Modern Russia is fundamentally different from the USSR. Following the collapse of the Soviet system in 1991, the country underwent a radical transformation of its economic model. While maintaining strong state control over strategic sectors, Moscow embraced a market economy, accumulated substantial financial reserves and significantly reduced public debt.
In the years preceding the conflict, Russia had built a relatively robust financial position, with one of the lowest debt-to-GDP ratios among major economies and large holdings of foreign currency and gold reserves. Moreover, the sanctions imposed after 2014 had already pushed the country toward partial industrial and agricultural self-sufficiency, reducing dependence on Western imports in key sectors.
This long process of adaptation enabled Russia to absorb the initial shock of Western sanctions far more effectively than anticipated. Although exclusion from Western financial markets was undoubtedly painful, it did not trigger a systemic banking collapse, thanks in part to strong state control and cautious monetary policy.
Energy as the Cornerstone of Western Strategy
Energy has been central to Western economic warfare against Russia. Oil and gas exports account for a significant share of Russian state revenues and thus play a crucial role in financing public spending and military operations.
The idea of deliberately lowering oil prices, potentially through coordinated increases in global supply or agreements with major producers, is intended to replicate the dynamics of the 1980s, when declining energy prices severely weakened Soviet finances. Yet once again, the global context has changed dramatically.
Today’s energy markets are more fragmented, Asian demand continues to grow and Western control over global energy flows is far weaker than in the past. Russia has also demonstrated a remarkable ability to redirect its exports toward alternative markets, often at discounted prices but with volumes sufficient to sustain fiscal stability.
China as the Pillar of Russian Economic Resilience
The most underestimated factor in Western analyses is undoubtedly China. Beijing is not merely a trading partner for Russia, but a systemic actor capable of providing Moscow with what the West seeks to deny it: markets, capital, technology and alternative financial channels.
China has significantly increased trade with Russia, purchasing large volumes of energy at favorable prices while supplying industrial goods, technological components and consumer products. This exchange allows Russia to keep its domestic economy functioning and partially offset the loss of European markets.
From a financial perspective, the growing use of the yuan in bilateral trade reduces reliance on the dollar and the euro, weakening the impact of Western sanctions. Although Chinese banks operate cautiously to avoid secondary sanctions, they nonetheless represent a critical outlet for Russia’s financial system.
A De Facto Strategic Alignment
It is important to emphasize that China’s support for Russia does not necessarily take the form of a formal military alliance. Rather, it reflects a convergence of strategic interests. Beijing views Western pressure on Moscow as a dangerous precedent that could one day be applied against China itself.
Supporting Russia therefore serves China’s broader objective of promoting a multipolar world order and weakening the West’s ability to use sanctions as a tool of geopolitical dominance. In this sense, assistance to Moscow is an integral part of a long-term strategy aimed at reshaping global power structures.
The Limits of Economic Warfare in a Multipolar World
Western confidence in Russia’s inevitable collapse is rooted in an outdated vision of globalization. In a world dominated by a single financial center and an uncontested reserve currency, sanctions could indeed strangle a national economy. Today, however, the international system is far more complex.
Alternative financial circuits, parallel markets and a wide range of actors willing to trade outside the Western orbit now exist. Russia, supported by China and connected to parts of the Global South, can rely on a sufficiently broad network of relationships to avoid immediate collapse.
This does not mean sanctions are ineffective or painless. They slow growth, increase costs and restrict access to advanced technologies. What they no longer guarantee, however, is the automatic political and economic breakdown that many Western decision-makers continue to expect.
Europe’s Strategic Illusion and Its Real Costs
Europe appears to be the most vulnerable actor in this strategy. Unlike the United States, which enjoys significant energy resources and greater strategic autonomy, European economies have paid a high price in terms of inflation, energy costs and industrial competitiveness.
The belief in a rapid Russian collapse encouraged European governments to accept substantial economic sacrifices, assuming they would be temporary. If Russia proves capable of resisting over the medium to long term, these costs risk becoming structural, fueling social and political tensions within the European Union.
Oil Prices as a Weapon with Diminishing Returns
The use of oil prices as a geopolitical weapon remains central to Western strategy, but its effectiveness has diminished. Russia has shown it can sustain its budget even with relatively low oil prices, thanks to competitive production costs and disciplined fiscal management.
Moreover, growing Asian demand and Chinese support provide Moscow with an economic buffer that did not exist during the Cold War. Even in the event of a sharp decline in prices, it is unlikely that Russia would suddenly lose the resources needed to maintain state functions and military operations.
The Political and Psychological Dimension of Russian Resilience
Beyond economics, there is a political and psychological dimension that Western analyses often underestimate. Russian leadership has framed the conflict as an existential struggle against the West, mobilizing domestic support and encouraging acceptance of economic hardship.
In such a context, economic collapse is not merely a question of financial indicators but of social and political cohesion. So far, the Kremlin has demonstrated its ability to manage dissent and maintain sufficient internal stability to continue the war effort.
Future Scenarios: A Protracted Conflict
Taken together, these factors suggest that Western expectations of a rapid Russian economic defeat rest on shaky foundations. Chinese support, combined with structural changes in the international system, makes a scenario of prolonged Russian resistance increasingly plausible, even in the face of renewed pressure on energy prices.
This does not imply that Russia is destined to prevail, but it does indicate that the conflict may extend far beyond initial forecasts, evolving into a war of attrition with high costs for all parties involved.
Conclusion
Western and European calculations regarding Russia’s presumed inability to sustain a long-term confrontation are increasingly open to question. They are based on an analysis that underestimates the transformation of the Russian economy, the multipolar nature of today’s global system and, above all, China’s crucial role as a guarantor of Moscow’s resilience.
In a world where economic and financial power is no longer monopolized by the West, strategies of economic strangulation lose much of their effectiveness. Supported by China and embedded in alternative economic networks, Russia possesses sufficient tools to withstand even deliberately induced shocks to global energy markets.
The illusion of a quick victory therefore risks becoming a long-term strategic error, with profound consequences not only for Russia, but also for Europe and for the global geopolitical balance.