The history of the last two centuries can also be interpreted as the history of the construction, defense, and transformation of an international system in which the Anglo-Saxon world, first through Great Britain and later through the United States, progressively assumed a central position. From this perspective, some of the great wars of the modern era cannot be interpreted solely as military conflicts between states, but also as moments of reorganization of economic, financial, political, and strategic balances.
Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 represented one of these moments. The defeat of Germany, Fascist Italy, and Japan in the Second World War represented another, even more important one. In both cases, the defeated powers were not simply destroyed: they were progressively reintegrated into a new international order constructed by the victorious powers.
This observation makes it possible to formulate a question of major geopolitical importance: could the model used after 1945 be reproduced today with regard to Russia and China?
The answer cannot simply be affirmative. Russia and China are nuclear, economic, demographic, and territorial powers of a completely different magnitude from Germany, Italy, and Japan in 1945. Nevertheless, there is a continuity in the strategic logic: a hegemonic power tends to construct an international order in which the strongest states are incorporated into a network of alliances, economic institutions, financial systems, and security mechanisms that limit their ability to build an alternative order.
It is precisely this perspective that makes it possible to interpret the contemporary competition between the United States, Russia, and China in a different way.
1815: Napoleon’s Defeat and the Integration of France
The Congress of Vienna of 1814–1815 represented one of the most important attempts to construct a European order after a major war. Napoleonic France had attempted to transform continental Europe into a system dominated by Paris. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo and the Second Restoration brought this project to an end.
But France was not erased from European politics. On the contrary, it was progressively reintegrated into the continental system. The objective of the victorious powers was not necessarily to eliminate France permanently as a great power, but rather to prevent it from rebuilding an autonomous hegemonic system.
This distinction is fundamental.
A defeated great power can either be destroyed or integrated into a new balance of power. In the second case, military victory represents only the first stage. The real strategic success consists in transforming the future behavior of the defeated state.
Post-Napoleonic France therefore constitutes an important precedent. After 1815, France remained a major European power, but it could no longer easily pursue the imperial project associated with Napoleon. Over time, it once again became an integral part of the European balance of power.
The Vienna system was therefore not merely a system of punishment. It was also a system of incorporation.
1945: The Real Geopolitical Revolution
The Second World War produced an even more radical transformation. Germany, Italy, and Japan emerged from the conflict militarily defeated, economically devastated, and politically transformed.
But the fundamental point is that the three defeated powers were not permanently kept on the margins of the Western international system.
On the contrary, within a few years West Germany, Italy, and Japan became fundamental components of the new Western system led by the United States.
Germany probably represents the most significant case.
In 1945, German territory was occupied and divided into zones of control. But as early as 1947, American policy began moving toward the economic and political reconstruction of West Germany. American diplomatic documents from the period explicitly demonstrate the objective of integrating West Germany into the European and Western economic system.
The Marshall Plan was decisive in this process. According to documentation from the U.S. State Department, the program contributed to Europe’s economic reconstruction and encouraged greater economic and political integration with the United States.
The transformation was therefore extraordinary: Germany, the main defeated continental power, was progressively transformed from a strategic enemy into a pillar of the Western system.
This was not simply a German choice. It was also the result of an American institutional project.
Between 1950 and 1955, Washington worked to permanently associate the Federal Republic of Germany with the West, ultimately leading to its integration into NATO. American documents from the period explicitly emphasized the need to orient West Germany toward the West through institutional, economic, and military ties.
This is one of the great geopolitical lessons of the postwar period: a defeated power can become part of the victor’s system without being deprived of its national identity.
Italy: From Defeat to Western Integration
Italy followed a similar path, although under different circumstances.
In 1943, the Fascist regime collapsed and the country went through a dramatic period of civil war, occupation, and division. After 1945, Italy progressively became an integral part of the Western bloc.
The Marshall Plan contributed to Italy’s economic reconstruction, while the creation of NATO consolidated its strategic relationship with the United States. American diplomatic documents from the period explicitly emphasized the role of economic assistance, NATO, and American protection in Italy’s reconstruction and Western orientation.
Italy therefore moved from being a defeated Axis state to becoming a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance.
The historical paradox is evident: the same Italy that had entered the war against Britain and the United States in 1940 became, only a few years later, a structural component of the political and military order led by Washington.
Japan: From Absolute Enemy to Pillar of the Western Order in Asia
Japan constitutes the third major example.
After its surrender in 1945, the United States assumed a predominant role in the occupation and reconstruction of the country. Between 1945 and 1952, profound military, political, economic, and social reforms were introduced. The Imperial Army was dismantled, political and economic reforms were initiated, and a new strategic relationship with Washington was progressively established.
The final result was remarkable.
Japan, which during the war had attempted to build its own Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and had fought directly against the United States, became one of America’s principal allies in Asia.
Once again, the fundamental principle was integration.
American military victory did not merely eliminate the Japanese threat. It created the conditions for transforming Japan into a central element of the new American balance of power in the Pacific.
From Enemy to Partner: The Logic of the Western Order
Germany, Italy, and Japan therefore demonstrate a common model.
First comes military defeat.
Then comes political transformation.
Economic reconstruction follows.
Finally, integration into the institutions of the new order takes place.
In Europe, the Marshall Plan and the construction of the Western institutional architecture were fundamental instruments. In the military sphere, NATO provided the strategic framework. In the economic sphere, the Western system facilitated the incorporation of European and Japanese economies into a circuit dominated by Western financial and commercial institutions.
West Germany became part of NATO. Italy became part of NATO. Japan became a fundamental American ally in Asia.
It is therefore difficult to deny that the postwar period produced a profound integration of former enemies into the Western system.
However, simply describing this process as “vassalage” would be historically reductive. Germany, Italy, and Japan progressively recovered sovereignty, economic capabilities, and political autonomy. Their relationship with Washington was asymmetrical, but it cannot be reduced to a simple form of subordination.
It is more accurate to speak of hierarchical integration within a hegemonic system.
The Cold War and the Transformation of the West into a System
The Cold War consolidated this model.
The United States did not control Western Europe simply through military presence. American power operated through a combination of instruments: security, finance, trade, technology, international institutions, alliances, and access to markets.
The result was the creation of a genuine Western geopolitical architecture.
NATO at the military level.
The international monetary system at the financial level.
Multilateral institutions at the economic level.
European integration at the continental level.
Global markets and international trade at the economic level.
This system enabled the United States to exercise a form of hegemony very different from the territorial empires of the past.
It was not necessary to directly govern Germany, Italy, or Japan.
It was sufficient to ensure that their fundamental strategic interests converged with those of the dominant power.
The Collapse of the USSR and the End of the Bipolar Balance
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 appeared to open a new phase.
For several years, the United States seemed to be the world’s only global superpower. NATO expanded eastward and Western economic integration deepened.
But history did not end in 1991.
Russia progressively returned to considering itself an autonomous great power. China, meanwhile, transformed its economic growth into extraordinary industrial, technological, and commercial capabilities.
This is where the comparison with 1945 becomes interesting, but also problematic.
Russia and China: The “Last Major Outsiders” to the Western System?
Russia and China are not Germany, Italy, or Japan.
This difference must be emphasized.
Russia possesses a huge strategic nuclear arsenal, continental territorial depth, and vast energy and mineral resources. China possesses an enormous population, a global-scale industrial base, growing technological capabilities, and a central role in global production chains.
There is therefore no realistic possibility of mechanically repeating the events of 1945.
Yet there is a fundamental geopolitical question: who will establish the rules of the international order in the twenty-first century?
NATO today considers Russia the main direct threat to Euro-Atlantic security and identifies China as a power whose ambitions and coercive policies challenge the Alliance’s interests, security, and values.
In 2026, NATO continues to describe strategic competition with Russia and China as a central feature of the new international environment.
These documents do not demonstrate the existence of a Western plan to transform Russia and China into “vassals.” They do, however, demonstrate something more general: the West considers the expansion of Moscow’s and Beijing’s strategic autonomy a challenge to the existing order.
And this is precisely where the real stakes emerge.
A New World War?
Defining the current phase as a “Third World War” or an “ongoing world war” requires caution. We are not facing a formally global conflict between two coalitions comparable to those of 1939–1945.
Nevertheless, we are witnessing a competition that simultaneously crosses several theaters: Eastern Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, the Arctic, cyberspace, technology, finance, trade, and industrial supply chains.
The war in Ukraine has become the main military theater of the confrontation between Russia and the West, while the technological and economic competition between the United States and China represents one of the main fronts in the transformation of the global order.
In this sense, it is possible to speak of a systemic war or global conflict over the international order, provided that it is made clear that this is an analytical definition rather than the official designation of a world war.
The Real Objective: Defeat or Integration?
The central question therefore becomes: is the Western objective to destroy Russia and China, or to force them to accept a role within the existing order?
Historically, the second model is often more effective.
A hegemonic power does not necessarily have an interest in completely destroying a major state. Its interest lies in preventing that state from constructing an alternative system.
This is what happened to West Germany after 1945.
Germany was not erased. It was integrated.
Japan was not eliminated as an economic power. It was integrated.
Italy was not permanently excluded from the international system. It was integrated.
The contemporary question is therefore whether Washington is pursuing something analogous with Moscow and Beijing: not necessarily their destruction, but their reintegration into an international system in which the fundamental rules are not independently established by them.
In the Russian case, this would mean preventing the construction of an autonomous Eurasian sphere of influence and bringing Moscow back toward a position compatible with the European security architecture.
In the Chinese case, it would mean preventing Beijing from transforming its industrial, technological, financial, and commercial power into an alternative order to the one led by the United States.
This is a fundamental distinction.
The objective is not necessarily to conquer Russia and China.
It is to prevent them from becoming centers of gravity for an alternative international order.
The Limits of the Strategy
But this is precisely where the fundamental problem emerges.
In 1945, Germany, Italy, and Japan had been militarily defeated and depended heavily on reconstruction. Russia and China are not in the same position.
Russia possesses nuclear weapons and enormous natural resources. China represents one of the world’s principal industrial and technological centers.
Furthermore, Russia and China have developed increasingly close relations with each other and with other states that challenge, to varying degrees, the Western order.
For this reason, the operation that succeeded with Germany, Italy, and Japan cannot simply be repeated.
The Western strategy may attempt to contain, weaken, isolate, or negotiate with these powers, but their complete assimilation would be much more difficult.
The Real Battle Is for the International Order
The decisive question is therefore not simply who will win the war in Ukraine, nor merely who will dominate Taiwan or the Pacific.
The fundamental question is who will establish the rules of the international system in the coming decades.
The United States wants to preserve an order in which Western alliances, the dollar, international financial institutions, technological networks, and American military superiority continue to represent the main pillars of the system.
Russia and China, in very different ways, are pursuing greater strategic autonomy.
Russia primarily seeks to prevent a European order completely subordinated to NATO and to preserve its own security sphere.
China, meanwhile, seeks to build an international position commensurate with its economic, industrial, and technological weight.
From this perspective, contemporary competition is a struggle between an established order and a possible multipolar architecture.
From 1815 to the Twenty-First Century: The Continuity of Geopolitics
The comparison between 1815, 1945, and the present therefore makes it possible to identify a certain continuity.
In 1815, the European powers sought to prevent Napoleonic France from rebuilding a continental hegemony.
In 1945, the United States and its allies constructed a new system in which Germany, Italy, and Japan, once defeated, were progressively reintegrated and transformed into fundamental components of the Western world.
In the twenty-first century, Washington faces a completely different situation, in which Russia and China challenge, in different ways, some of the pillars of the existing international order.
The great question is therefore whether we will witness a new integration or a genuine systemic rupture.
The first possibility would require Russia and China to accept a role within the Western-led order. The second would involve the progressive formation of a multipolar international system in which the United States, China, Russia, India, and other powers compete to define rules, institutions, and spheres of influence.
The essential point is that geopolitics is not only about the conquest of territory, but above all about the construction of order.
The real victory of a great power does not necessarily consist in annihilating its enemy. It consists in creating a system in which the former adversary no longer has the ability or the will to construct an alternative order.
This is the lesson that 1815 and 1945 offer to contemporary history.
But the twenty-first century presents a new difficulty: Russia and China possess resources, populations, technology, industrial capabilities and, in Russia’s case, nuclear capabilities that make a simple repetition of the model applied to Germany, Italy, and Japan extremely difficult.
For this reason, the current competition could represent something even more important than a simple war between states.
It could be the struggle to determine whether the twenty-first century will continue to be organized around American hegemony or whether a genuinely multipolar system will emerge.
And this is probably the deeper geopolitical meaning of the contemporary crisis: not merely determining who will win a particular war, but determining who will have the power to establish the rules of world politics after the great hegemonic transition.