The war in Ukraine has become one of the most important geopolitical events of the twenty-first century. Four years after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, the conflict can no longer be analyzed solely through the sequence of military operations or through the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The war has transformed European energy relations, accelerated the growth of military spending, affected public finances, reshaped economic relations between Europe, Russia, the United States and Asia, and contributed to the progressive fragmentation of the international order.
The balance of the conflict, at the end of 2026, therefore presents a fundamental characteristic: none of the maximalist objectives of the main parties involved has been fully achieved. Russia has not conquered the whole of Ukraine, has not overthrown the government in Kyiv and has not prevented Ukraine from moving closer to the Euro-Atlantic sphere. Ukraine, supported financially and militarily by the West, has prevented a decisive Russian victory, but has not recovered all the territories lost. The West, meanwhile, has kept Ukraine within its strategic sphere and strengthened NATO on its eastern flank, but has not achieved a political transformation of the Russian system or the subordination of Moscow to the Western order.
It is precisely this intermediate situation, far removed from both the narrative of victory and that of absolute defeat, that makes a broader assessment necessary.
Four Years of War: From a Short War to a War of Attrition
In February 2022, many observers expected the conflict to end relatively quickly. Russia’s initial military operation failed, however, to achieve its objective of capturing Kyiv and triggered a rapid reorganization of Ukrainian resistance.
The war gradually became an industrial and attritional conflict. Artillery, missiles, drones, electronic warfare, satellite intelligence and ammunition production became essential elements. Ukraine succeeded in retaking significant areas of territory during 2022, while Russia subsequently consolidated control over substantial parts of the eastern and southern regions.
According to an analysis published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in February 2026, Russia controlled approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea and the parts of Donbas occupied before 2022; around 12% of Ukraine had been captured by Russian forces after the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Russian territorial gains during 2024 and 2025 remained relatively limited compared with the scale of the initial offensive.
The territorial dynamics during 2026 have continued to be characterized by extremely slow advances. A subsequent CSIS analysis even recorded a net contraction in the territory controlled by Russia during April and May 2026, although within an overall military environment that remained extremely unstable.
This distinction is important because it makes it possible to avoid two opposite simplifications. On the one hand, Russia has not conquered Ukraine. On the other hand, Russia has not been militarily expelled from Ukrainian territory. The war therefore remains a war of attrition in which the distance between the resources consumed and the territorial results achieved has become enormous.
The Question of Western Objectives
A methodological distinction is necessary here. Speaking of “Western objectives” can be misleading unless one distinguishes between officially declared objectives and objectives that analysts attribute to Western strategy.
The European Union officially states that it seeks a peace based on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, while NATO has described its support as assistance to Ukraine in defending itself against Russian aggression. In February 2026, on the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion, European institutions reaffirmed their political, financial, economic, humanitarian and military support for Kyiv.
There is therefore insufficient documentary evidence to state that regime change in the Kremlin was an official objective of the EU or NATO.
Nevertheless, much broader interpretations have been developed within Western strategic debate: structurally weakening Russia’s military capabilities, reducing Moscow’s geopolitical influence, limiting its ability to project power in Europe and preventing Russia from changing the European security order through military force.
It is on the basis of results that a balance can be drawn.
If an objective attributed to part of Western strategy had been to trigger the collapse of the Russian political system, that result has not occurred. Vladimir Putin has remained in power, the Russian state and military apparatus have survived, and Moscow has continued to maintain economic and strategic relations with China, India, Iran, North Korea and other countries.
If the objective had been to achieve a decisive military defeat of Russia, that outcome has also not occurred. Russia has suffered enormous costs, but it still maintains significant military forces in Ukraine and controls a substantial part of the occupied territories.
Finally, if the objective had been to bring Russia back into an international order substantially subordinate to the West, that outcome appears even more distant. Western sanctions have reduced numerous economic links with Europe, but they have simultaneously accelerated Russia’s economic and strategic reorientation toward Asia.
Russia Has Not Been Defeated, But It Has Paid an Enormous Price
The failure to achieve a Russian defeat should not be confused with the absence of costs for Moscow.
The war has generated enormous human, material and financial expenditure. Russia has suffered substantial military losses, while its defense industry and war-related production have become increasingly important to the national economy.
Russia has also had to devote an increasing share of its economic resources to military production. Defense spending, ammunition manufacturing and the military-industrial complex have assumed a much greater role.
Yet the Russian economy has not collapsed.
Western sanctions have produced significant consequences and restricted Russia’s access to Western technologies, capital and markets. Moscow has nevertheless compensated for part of the loss of European markets by strengthening or maintaining commercial relations with other major economies.
The result is a Russia that is more militarized, more dependent on energy exports and more oriented toward Asia than it was in 2021.
This transformation is one of the most important geopolitical consequences of the war.
The European Price: Energy, Growth and Public Finances
The most visible consequence for Europe has been the breakdown of the energy model progressively constructed after the end of the Cold War.
Before 2022, Europe had developed a strong dependence on Russian natural gas. The war fundamentally changed this relationship.
The European Union dramatically reduced its dependence on Russian pipeline gas and increased imports of liquefied natural gas, while developing alternative supply routes and new energy infrastructure.
From the perspective of energy security, this transformation reduced dependence on a single supplier.
But diversification came at a cost.
Europe had to rapidly increase LNG imports, expand regasification capacity and replace a significant part of its previous energy supply system. The result has been a profound restructuring of the European energy market.
This means that Europe has become less dependent on Russian pipeline gas but, at the same time, more exposed to global LNG markets and their price dynamics.
The transformation has therefore created greater diversification but also a new form of vulnerability.
And this is where the issue of debt becomes particularly important.
The War and the Worsening of European Debt
It would be economically incorrect to argue that the war “created” European debt. European governments already had high levels of public debt before 2022 as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis, the eurozone crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and years of extraordinary fiscal intervention.
It is nevertheless equally difficult to argue that the war has had no impact on the fiscal situation.
The energy crisis required governments to introduce measures designed to protect households and companies from soaring energy prices. At the same time, European states had to increase defense spending, support Ukraine, manage the arrival of refugees and adapt energy infrastructure.
The European Union’s public-debt ratio remains high, while higher defense expenditure and interest costs continue to put pressure on public finances.
The relationship between war and debt must therefore be interpreted as an indirect causal chain.
The war generates an energy and trade shock. The shock increases costs and can weaken growth. Governments respond with additional public expenditure. At the same time, military spending increases. The result is additional pressure on national budgets.
The conflict therefore becomes a public-finance issue as well as a military and geopolitical issue.
New European Debt to Support Ukraine
The financial dimension of the war has become even more evident in 2026.
The European Union has structured a major financial package for Ukraine covering the 2026–2027 period. The European mechanism demonstrates how the war has transformed the European budget and the EU’s common borrowing capacity into instruments of security policy.
This does not mean that the entire amount automatically becomes the debt of each individual member state. European-level borrowing is supported by the EU budget and differs from direct borrowing by national governments.
Nevertheless, the mechanism demonstrates how security policy and financial policy have become increasingly interconnected.
The strategic issue is therefore broader than the direct cost of military assistance.
Europe is entering a phase in which security, defense industry, energy and public finance are increasingly interconnected.
The war has consequently contributed to a transformation of European fiscal priorities.
The Transformation of Europe-Russia Relations
One of the deepest strategic consequences has been the destruction of much of the economic interdependence between Europe and Russia that had developed after 1991.
For decades, Europe imported energy from Russia while Russia used energy revenues to finance its economy and purchase European goods, technologies and services.
This model was imperfect and generated mutual dependencies, but it also represented an important economic incentive for cooperation.
The war broke this economic circuit.
Europe drastically reduced Russian imports. Russia sought new markets. The result has been a process of economic separation between Europe and Russia that is considerably deeper than many observers could have imagined before 2022.
From a geopolitical perspective, however, this separation has not necessarily produced Russian isolation.
Instead, it has produced a different geographical orientation.
Russia’s Shift Toward Asia
Russia’s increasingly close relations with China, India, Iran and other non-Western countries represent one of the most significant consequences of the conflict.
Russia has continued exporting energy and raw materials to non-Western markets, while China has become an increasingly important economic and strategic partner.
From this perspective, the war has accelerated a trend that had already begun before 2022: the construction of Eurasian economic relationships less dependent on Western markets.
This does not mean that Russia and China constitute a perfectly homogeneous geopolitical bloc. Their interests do not always coincide. Nevertheless, the relationship between Moscow and Beijing has become structurally more important.
This transformation is particularly significant when considering the European geopolitical project that developed after 1991.
The idea of progressive economic integration across the European continent, potentially including Russia, has effectively been interrupted.
Europe has moved closer to the Atlantic.
Russia has moved closer to Asia.
The geopolitical dividing line across the continent has therefore deepened.
A Stronger NATO, but a More Dependent Europe?
The war has also produced an outcome that can hardly be described as a Western defeat: NATO has become more cohesive on its eastern flank and has expanded through the accession of Finland and Sweden.
At the same time, however, Europe has had to recognize its enormous dependence on American military capabilities.
The increase in European defense spending can be interpreted as an attempt to reduce this dependence. NATO’s new target of reaching 5% of GDP for defense and defense-related activities by 2035 demonstrates how profoundly the war has changed strategic priorities within the Alliance.
This creates an apparently contradictory situation.
On the one hand, Europe is developing greater military capabilities of its own.
On the other hand, the conflict has reinforced the strategic centrality of the United States within Europe’s security architecture.
European strategic autonomy therefore remains an unresolved issue.
The Problem of Victory
After four years, the word “victory” has become increasingly difficult to define.
If victory means the complete military defeat of Russia, this outcome has not occurred.
If Russian victory means the conquest of all of Ukraine and the fall of the government in Kyiv, that outcome has also not occurred.
If the Western objective was to prevent Russia from changing the European order through military force, the situation is ambiguous: Russia has not conquered Ukraine, but it still controls a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and has demonstrated the ability to sustain a prolonged conventional war against a country supported by a large international coalition.
If, instead, the objective was, according to certain strategic interpretations, to provoke the collapse of the Russian political system or bring Russia under Western influence, that outcome is not observable.
Russia remains a major military and nuclear power, retains a central role in global energy markets and has strengthened relations with major Asian economies.
A More Indebted Europe and a Europe Less Integrated with Russia
The real outcome of the war may therefore be described not as a definitive victory for one side, but as a structural transformation of Europe.
Europe has lost a substantial part of its direct access to Russian energy.
It has increased LNG imports.
It has increased defense spending.
It has taken on additional financial commitments toward Ukraine.
It continues to face high public-debt levels.
It has changed its industrial policies.
It has strengthened its security relationship with the United States.
And it has progressively abandoned the idea of a large European economic area that could include Russia, at least to some degree.
These changes cannot be attributed exclusively to the war: some of these trends were already underway. Nevertheless, the conflict has accelerated them dramatically.
The Strategic Paradox
The paradox is that the war has simultaneously weakened and strengthened different actors.
Russia has suffered enormous military losses and unprecedented sanctions, but it has not collapsed.
Ukraine has suffered enormous destruction and remains heavily dependent on external assistance, but it has maintained its state sovereignty and prevented a decisive Russian victory.
The United States has strengthened its role in European security, but it has also faced substantial economic and military costs and an increasingly competitive global strategic environment.
Europe has strengthened NATO and diversified its energy sources, but it has faced higher energy costs, greater military investment requirements and a more complex fiscal situation.
The result is therefore very different from a war concluded through a peace treaty with a clearly recognized winner.
The War as a Break in the European Order
The fundamental question is no longer simply who will capture a particular city or what the final frontline will look like.
The real issue concerns the geopolitical order that will emerge from the war.
Before 2022, it was still possible to imagine a large European economic area characterized by substantial interdependence between the European Union and Russia.
After 2022, that prospect has become extremely difficult.
The European Union has transformed REPowerEU into a permanent instrument for reducing dependence on Russian energy. The process has resulted in a dramatic reduction in Russian energy imports and a restructuring of Europe’s entire energy system.
At the same time, NATO has strengthened its military presence in Eastern Europe.
The war has therefore created a new strategic frontier.
This frontier separates a Europe integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security architecture from a Russia increasingly oriented toward Eurasia.
The Balance After Four Years
Four years after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the balance of the Ukraine war is considerably more complex than narratives of victory or defeat suggest.
Russia has not achieved its initial maximalist objectives. It has not captured Kyiv, has not overthrown the Ukrainian government and has not prevented Ukraine from strengthening its European and Euro-Atlantic orientation. Western analyses themselves acknowledge that Russia’s territorial gains have remained far below the scale of its initial objectives.
But neither has the objective of transforming Russia according to Western interests materialized.
The Kremlin has not fallen.
Russia has not suffered a decisive military defeat.
The Russian political system has not been replaced.
The Russian economy has not collapsed.
Russia has not been brought back into the Western economic sphere.
Instead, the conflict has accelerated the restructuring of Russian economic relations toward Asia.
For Europe, the price has been particularly significant. The continent has had to undertake an accelerated energy transformation, increase military spending and assume new financial commitments. European public debt remains high, while higher defense expenditure and other fiscal pressures continue to shape the economic outlook.
Europe has also taken on increasingly substantial financial commitments toward Ukraine. The EU and its member states have provided extensive financial, economic, humanitarian and military assistance, while additional European financing mechanisms have been created to support Ukraine over the medium term.
The war has therefore not simply changed a border.
It has transformed the European economic model, the energy system, fiscal priorities, industrial policy, military architecture and relations between Europe and Russia.
The central point of the balance is therefore not to artificially identify a winner.
It is to recognize that, after four years, the maximalist objectives of the different parties do not correspond to the results actually achieved.
Russia has not conquered Ukraine.
Ukraine has not fully recovered the occupied territories.
The West has not transformed Russia into a state subordinate to its geopolitical architecture.
Europe has not returned to the energy situation that existed before 2022.
And the international system has become more fragmented.
The war has therefore produced a new balance, but it has not yet produced a new stability.
This is perhaps its most important geopolitical characteristic: after four years, the conflict no longer appears to be a temporary episode in European history, but a structural rupture in the geopolitical order that emerged after the end of the Cold War.
The decisive questions for the coming years will not concern only the future frontline. They will also concern the relationship that emerges between Russia, Europe, the United States and Asia; the financial cost of rebuilding Ukraine; how long Europe can sustain increasing defense expenditure without compromising other fiscal priorities; and, above all, whether a new European security system can be created in which Russia is treated as a permanent element of the continental balance rather than exclusively as a threat to be contained.
In this sense, the balance of the Ukraine war after four years remains open.
And it is precisely the absence of a definitive solution that represents the most important geopolitical fact of the conflict.