The Middle East as a Major Arena of Global Competition
The Middle East remains one of the most important arenas of global geopolitical competition. Its importance derives not only from its enormous energy resources, but also from its geographical position, which connects the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, Central Asia, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Whoever is able to control, influence or strategically shape this space can exercise a significant role in the international balance of power.
Within this context, the relationship between the United States and Iran represents one of the central issues of contemporary international politics. Washington has considered the Islamic Republic a destabilizing force in the region for decades, particularly within a regional security system built around American alliances with Israel and several Arab Gulf monarchies. Tehran, by contrast, views the American military presence in the region as a form of strategic encirclement and considers its security inseparable from its ability to develop strategic depth through alliances, regional partners and relations with major Eurasian powers.
The current situation also presents a major difference compared with the past: Iran is no longer isolated in the same way it was several decades ago. Its growing economic integration with China, its strategic relationship with Russia, its participation in organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and its ability to develop a substantial missile and drone industry have profoundly changed the geopolitical landscape.
China has developed increasingly important economic, diplomatic and strategic relations with Tehran, while avoiding turning this relationship into a formal military alliance. Beijing is also extremely careful to maintain relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf partners.
This transformation raises a fundamental question: Are the United States once again applying a policy of “divide and rule” in the Middle East by encouraging Sunni states to perceive Iran as their principal strategic threat?
The answer requires caution. There is not necessarily a single secret and centralized American plan. It is more accurate to speak of a strategy of regional containment and balance of power, in which alliances, deterrence, arms sales, military deployments and partnerships with regional powers are used to prevent any single actor from achieving regional hegemony.
The Principle of “Divide and Rule” in Geopolitical History
The principle of “divide and rule” is much older than the United States. Empires throughout history have frequently exploited local rivalries, ethnic divisions, religious differences, economic interests and political conflicts to prevent the emergence of coalitions powerful enough to challenge the central authority.
In the modern Middle East, however, the concept must be used carefully.
The region is not simply divided between Sunnis and Shiites. Sunni monarchies have different and sometimes competing interests. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and other states do not necessarily share identical strategic objectives.
Iran itself is not a monolithic actor. Its foreign policy combines ideology, national security, economic interests, Persian historical identity and regional ambitions.
The Sunni-Shia divide is therefore a real dimension of Middle Eastern politics, but it is not sufficient to explain the entire geopolitical structure of the region.
Nevertheless, precisely because this division exists, major powers can use it as one of the mechanisms through which alliances and systems of deterrence are constructed.
Iran as the Main Challenger to the American Regional Order
To understand American strategy, it is necessary to begin with Iran’s geopolitical position.
The Islamic Republic possesses an extraordinary geographical advantage. To the north, it borders the Caucasus and Central Asia. To the east lie Afghanistan and Pakistan. To the west are Iraq and the Levant. To the south, Iran has direct access to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.
This location allows Tehran to interact simultaneously with the Middle East, Eurasia and the Indian Ocean.
Iran also possesses enormous energy resources, a large population, a significant industrial base and a military capability developed progressively over decades of sanctions.
This last factor is particularly important.
Western sanctions have not prevented Iran from developing substantial domestic capabilities in missiles, drones and several other military technologies.
Tehran has also developed a network of relations with regional partners and non-state actors, allowing it to project influence beyond its national borders.
For Washington, therefore, the Iranian challenge is not limited to the nuclear issue.
It is fundamentally a question of regional balance of power.
An Iran that is economically integrated with Asia, militarily capable of threatening strategic infrastructure in the Gulf and diplomatically supported by major Eurasian powers represents a far more complex challenge than the isolated Iran of previous decades.
The Construction of a Sunni Regional Front
This is where the relationship between the United States and the Sunni monarchies becomes particularly important.
For decades, Washington has built an extensive network of military and security cooperation with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and other regional states.
Military bases, missile systems, intelligence cooperation, naval capabilities, air defense and arms sales have created a security structure in which the United States has traditionally played the role of the main external guarantor.
The strategic logic is relatively straightforward: prevent Iran from acquiring a dominant position in the Persian Gulf.
This policy can be interpreted through the theory of the balance of power.
Rather than attempting to eliminate an adversary completely, a major power can prevent that adversary from becoming strong enough to dominate the regional system.
The result is a configuration in which the United States maintains a role as security guarantor and strategic balancer.
This is where the logic of “divide and rule” can become an interpretive framework.
If regional states perceive Iran as their main threat, they have a strong incentive to maintain security cooperation with Washington.
The stronger the perceived Iranian threat becomes, the greater the potential demand for American security guarantees.
But the Regional System Is Changing
The problem for the United States is that the Middle East of the twenty-first century is no longer the Middle East of the Cold War.
The Gulf monarchies are pursuing increasingly autonomous foreign policies.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have developed relations simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Moscow and other powers.
China has become a crucial economic partner for numerous Middle Eastern countries.
Beijing imports large quantities of energy from the region and has a vital interest in the stability of international trade routes.
China therefore cannot afford to view the Middle East exclusively through the lens of the American-Iranian confrontation.
Its approach is consequently much more pragmatic.
China seeks to maintain strategic and economic relations with Iran while preserving its extensive commercial partnerships with the Gulf monarchies.
This is a crucial point.
China does not necessarily want to replace the United States as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf.
Its primary objective is to ensure that the regional order does not obstruct its economic and strategic expansion.
Russia and Iran: A Partnership Rather Than a Traditional Alliance
The relationship between Russia and Iran must also be examined without excessive simplification.
Moscow and Tehran share important strategic interests, including opposition to American dominance, energy cooperation, military relations and common interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
However, Russia and Iran are not simply two components of a perfectly integrated geopolitical bloc.
Moscow has its own interests in the Middle East and must take into account its relations with Turkey, Israel, the Arab monarchies and other regional actors.
Furthermore, the war in Ukraine has absorbed a significant portion of Russia’s military and economic resources.
Russia and China can therefore provide Iran with diplomatic, economic and strategic support without necessarily transforming the relationship into a formal military alliance.
This distinction is essential because it prevents an overly simplistic representation of a supposed Russia-China-Iran axis.
Iran’s Real Strength: Resilience
One of the most remarkable aspects of the Iranian case has been its ability to withstand economic and military pressure.
For years, sanctions were regarded as a tool capable of progressively isolating the Iranian economy.
Iran, however, developed mechanisms of adaptation.
A significant share of its energy exports has increasingly been redirected toward Asian markets, particularly China.
At the same time, Tehran has sought to use bilateral agreements, alternative currencies, informal trade networks and financial mechanisms capable of reducing its dependence on Western-dominated systems.
China has become particularly important in this strategy.
The relationship between Beijing and Tehran has expanded into a partnership involving economic, diplomatic and security dimensions.
This does not mean that Iran is economically prosperous.
On the contrary, the Iranian economy continues to suffer from severe sanctions, inflation, financial restrictions and limited integration with Western markets.
The real surprise is rather the country’s ability to survive and continue generating geopolitical power despite prolonged economic isolation.
Economic Warfare as a Geopolitical Instrument
The Iranian case also demonstrates that economic sanctions can produce paradoxical effects.
On the one hand, sanctions weaken the targeted economy.
On the other, they can encourage the targeted state to seek new partners.
Iran has progressively developed a strategy oriented toward the East.
China represents a major energy market.
Russia constitutes an important strategic and military partner.
Iran’s membership in BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has further strengthened its position within alternative international networks.
This does not mean that these organizations constitute a unified anti-American military bloc.
It means, however, that Iran now possesses a considerably broader network of international relationships than it did several decades ago.
This network makes a strategy of complete isolation considerably more difficult to implement.
The Persian Gulf as the Center of the Strategic Contest
At the heart of the competition remains the Persian Gulf.
The reason is obvious: energy and global trade.
The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints.
Its strategic importance is so great that any major confrontation between the United States and Iran can immediately affect energy markets and international shipping.
The Gulf therefore remains one of the most sensitive points in the global geopolitical system.
The Iranian ability to threaten or disrupt maritime traffic represents a form of asymmetric deterrence that cannot easily be ignored by the United States or the Gulf monarchies.
This is one of the reasons why control, protection and monitoring of the Persian Gulf remain central components of American strategy.
The Paradox of “Divide and Rule”
This is where the great paradox of American Middle Eastern strategy emerges.
A policy based on balancing regional powers may be effective in the short term but generate unintended consequences in the long term.
If Sunni states are encouraged to perceive Iran as an existential threat, they may strengthen their dependence on the United States.
But if Washington simultaneously loses credibility as the unquestioned guarantor of regional security, those same states may begin diversifying their strategic partnerships.
The result could be the opposite of what was originally intended.
Instead of consolidating a Middle Eastern system centered on the United States, American pressure could accelerate the emergence of a multipolar Middle East.
Saudi Arabia maintains relations with Washington while expanding ties with Beijing.
The United Arab Emirates develops relationships with the United States, China and India.
Iran strengthens its ties with China and Russia.
Turkey maintains relations with NATO, Russia, China and the broader Muslim world.
The Middle East is therefore becoming a system in which no actor can easily be incorporated into a single geopolitical bloc.
The Chinese Variable
China could become one of the principal beneficiaries of this transformation.
Beijing does not need to conquer the Middle East militarily.
It can increase its influence through trade, infrastructure, investment, energy and diplomacy.
This strategy differs fundamentally from the traditional American model.
The United States has built much of its regional influence through military security guarantees.
China increasingly builds influence through commerce, infrastructure, investment and economic interdependence.
This difference could become decisive over the long term.
If the Middle East continues to integrate economically with Asia, American strategic centrality could gradually decline even without an American military defeat.
Iran as a Bridge Between the Middle East and Eurasia
The broader geopolitical importance of Iran therefore lies in its position as a bridge.
Iran can simultaneously act as a Middle Eastern power, a Persian Gulf actor and a participant in the expanding Eurasian economic and strategic system.
This makes Iran particularly important to both China and Russia.
For Beijing, Iran represents an important energy supplier and a potential strategic node connecting Asia with the Middle East through land and maritime routes.
For Moscow, Tehran is a significant partner in the Caspian region, the Caucasus and the broader Eurasian geopolitical architecture.
For Washington, an Iran fully integrated into the Eurasian economy would represent a strategic challenge because it would reduce the effectiveness of policies designed to isolate Tehran.
A New Middle Eastern Cold War?
The current situation should not, however, be described simply as a new Cold War.
Contemporary international relations are considerably more fluid.
A country can simultaneously be an economic partner and a strategic competitor.
China can cooperate with Iran while maintaining deep economic relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Russia can cooperate with Tehran while maintaining diplomatic relations with the Arab monarchies.
The United States can remain closely aligned with Israel and Gulf states while simultaneously seeking negotiations with Iran.
The geopolitics of the twenty-first century is characterized precisely by this overlapping structure of interests.
Could “Divide and Rule” Produce a Multipolar Middle East?
American policy in the Middle East can, at least partly, be interpreted through the logic of divide and rule: maintaining a regional balance in which Iran cannot become hegemonic and in which Sunni states continue to regard cooperation with Washington as essential to their security.
However, this strategy should not necessarily be interpreted as a conspiracy or as evidence of a single secret plan.
It is more accurately understood as a traditional balance-of-power strategy.
The problem is that the international system in which this strategy was developed is changing rapidly.
Iran has demonstrated a degree of resilience that has exceeded the expectations of many analysts. China has transformed its relationship with Tehran into a significant economic and diplomatic partnership while remaining cautious about direct military commitments. Russia continues to regard Iran as a strategic partner, although its ability to provide direct support is constrained by the war in Ukraine.
At the same time, the Gulf monarchies are seeking greater strategic autonomy.
This could fundamentally transform the regional geopolitical landscape.
The paradox is that a strategy designed to prevent the emergence of a unified anti-American regional bloc could unintentionally contribute to something different: a multipolar Middle East, in which the United States, China, Russia, Iran, Turkey and the Arab monarchies simultaneously compete and cooperate.
The decisive question will therefore not simply be whether Washington can “contain” Tehran.
The real question is whether the United States can preserve its central role while Iran becomes increasingly integrated into Eurasian economic and strategic networks.
If this integration continues, the Iranian question could acquire a meaning far broader than the traditional rivalry between Washington and Tehran.
It could become one of the key indicators of the transition from an American-led unipolar order toward a genuinely multipolar international system.
And this is perhaps the most important geopolitical lesson of the contemporary Middle East: any power that seeks to divide its rivals in order to preserve its own balance must always consider the possibility that those rivals may eventually learn to build an alternative balance of power.