Two Wars, One Strategic Pattern
The war in Ukraine, launched by Russia in February 2022, has reopened a confrontation between Moscow and the West that many analysts consider the most serious since the Cold War.
To fully grasp the economic and geopolitical dimensions of this conflict, we must look back four decades — to 1980, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
Then, as now, a Eurasian great power became mired in a prolonged conflict, subjected to external economic pressure, international isolation, and mounting military costs.
Today, Western strategy — based on sanctions, indirect military support, and economic attrition — recalls the same principles that helped exhaust the USSR during the Afghan war.
2. The Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989): A Cold War Test of Attrition
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was officially framed as an operation to stabilize a friendly socialist government in Kabul. Yet within the Cold War context, the United States and its allies saw the invasion as an opportunity to trap Moscow in its own Vietnam.
Through the CIA’s Operation Cyclone, Washington covertly financed and armed Afghan mujahideen, supplying Stinger missiles, small arms, and logistics via Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
The result was a prolonged asymmetric war: Soviet forces, though militarily superior, were drawn into a costly occupation they could not win.
2.1. Economic and Political Impact
The Afghan conflict came at a time when the Soviet economy was stagnating. Military expenditures reached over 15% of GDP, diverting resources from civilian needs.
Meanwhile, the collapse in oil prices during the 1980s — partly driven by U.S.–Saudi coordination — sharply reduced the USSR’s foreign currency revenues.
This combination of rising war costs and shrinking energy income proved devastating, contributing to the economic and political unraveling that culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.
3. The War in Ukraine: A Modern War of Attrition
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, it declared goals of “demilitarization” and “denazification.” Yet, the war quickly turned into a protracted conflict of attrition against a resilient Ukraine backed by Western powers.
The United States, NATO, and the European Union responded not with direct intervention, but through a multilayered strategy combining:
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Comprehensive sanctions targeting Russia’s finance, trade, and technology sectors;
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Massive arms deliveries and real-time intelligence support to Ukraine;
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Diplomatic isolation of Moscow;
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Information warfare aimed at undermining Russia’s legitimacy.
The intent is not an immediate military victory, but a long-term weakening of Russia’s economic, industrial, and military base — much like Washington’s approach to the USSR during the 1980s.
4. Proxy Warfare: Then and Now
4.1. Afghanistan in the 1980s: America’s Hidden War
In the 1980s, Afghanistan became a proxy battlefield for the Cold War. The United States avoided direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, opting instead to arm and fund local resistance forces.
This indirect strategy allowed Washington to:
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Avoid escalation between nuclear powers;
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Bleed Soviet resources in a costly quagmire;
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Undermine Moscow’s prestige in the developing world.
4.2. Ukraine in the 2020s: The Hybrid Western Response
Today, the same logic applies. The West supports Ukraine with weapons, intelligence, and training, while avoiding formal entry into the war.
This is the essence of a hybrid or proxy conflict — one where the confrontation between great powers unfolds through intermediaries.
In both cases, the aim is strategic: to raise the costs of war for the adversary until it becomes economically and politically unsustainable.
5. The Economic Factor: From Oil Prices to Sanctions
5.1. The Soviet Economy Under Pressure
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union relied heavily on oil and gas exports to earn hard currency. When global oil prices collapsed in 1985 — falling from over $30 to under $10 per barrel — the USSR’s revenues plunged.
This external shock, combined with the immense cost of the Afghan war, destabilized Soviet public finances and exposed the inefficiencies of its centralized economic system.
5.2. Russia’s War Economy and the Sanctions Shock
In today’s context, Russia faces a similar squeeze, though under different conditions. The West has imposed the broadest sanctions regime in modern history, targeting:
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The financial sector (SWIFT exclusion, asset freezes);
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The energy industry, through embargoes and price caps;
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The technology and defense industries, cutting access to Western components;
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The export markets, through trade restrictions.
The effects have been significant:
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Declining gas exports to Europe;
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Rising military expenditure;
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Supply shortages in high-tech and industrial sectors;
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Inflation and fiscal pressure on the domestic economy.
As in the 1980s, Russia must sustain a costly war while its foreign revenues are constrained — a dynamic that recalls the late-Soviet predicament, though under a different global order.
6. The Logic of a War Economy
War reshapes economies. Modern conflicts, especially those of attrition, demand continuous industrial and fiscal mobilization.
6.1. The Cost of Prolonged Conflict
Russia’s defense spending has risen to over 6% of GDP, its highest level since the Cold War. The state channels funds into arms production, missile development, and mobilization, while civilian sectors struggle with shortages and inflation.
Indicators of strain include:
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Expanding budget deficits and ruble devaluation;
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Labor shortages, as hundreds of thousands are drafted or emigrate;
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Increased centralization of the economy under state and military control.
6.2. The “Afghanistan Effect”
The parallel with the Soviet experience is clear: both wars risk turning into economic traps.
In Afghanistan, the USSR lost not only soldiers but financial stability and global influence.
In Ukraine, the long-term economic sustainability of Russia’s war effort is the key question — whether it can outlast Western sanctions and maintain domestic support.
7. Key Differences: Russia Is Not the USSR
Despite the structural similarities, the Russia of today differs profoundly from the Soviet Union of the 1980s.
7.1. A More Flexible Economy
Russia’s post-Soviet economy is more market-oriented and globally connected.
It entered the war with large foreign reserves, low public debt, and strong energy exports. Moreover, Moscow has partially offset the loss of European markets by redirecting trade toward China, India, and the Global South.
7.2. Political and Informational Control
Unlike the late Soviet Union, Russia’s political system remains highly centralized and authoritarian, capable of suppressing dissent and controlling narratives.
This internal cohesion gives the Kremlin greater short-term stability, though at the cost of innovation and long-term economic dynamism.
7.3. A Multipolar World Order
In the 1980s, the global system was bipolar — the USSR faced a united Western bloc.
Today, the landscape is multipolar: many major states (China, India, Iran, Brazil) refuse to join Western sanctions, offering Moscow partial economic lifelines.
Thus, while the West’s pressure is significant, it is less absolute than during the Cold War.
8. The Geopolitics of Economic Attrition
The underlying strategy behind Western policy is not to destroy Russia militarily, but to erode its capacity for global projection — to limit its resources, isolate its economy, and force it into a costly stalemate.
This is a strategy of attrition, employing economic and technological tools instead of direct confrontation.
It mirrors Cold War doctrines that sought to exhaust the Soviet system through indirect containment and economic competition.
However, this approach carries risks.
Just as the Soviet collapse triggered instability across Eurasia, a prolonged war in Ukraine and a weakened Russia could destabilize global energy markets, supply chains, and food security.
Moreover, sanctions and rising energy prices have global repercussions, affecting Europe’s industry and developing economies alike.
9. Lessons from History: The Paradox of Prolonged Wars
Both Afghanistan (1979–1989) and Ukraine (2022– ) reveal the paradox of long wars between asymmetrical powers.
The stronger side may win battles, but lose strategically if the conflict drains its economy and legitimacy.
For the Soviet Union, the Afghan war was a slow bleed that eroded confidence in the regime.
For Russia, Ukraine represents both an opportunity for imperial resurgence and a potential trap — one that could strain its economy, alienate allies, and weaken its long-term position.
Yet history does not repeat itself mechanically.
Russia today operates in a more diversified, interconnected, and multipolar environment.
While the Soviet Union collapsed under combined military and economic strain, the Russian Federation may instead face gradual stagnation rather than sudden collapse.
10. Conclusion: The Repetition of Patterns
The comparison between the Soviet–Afghan war and the Russian–Ukrainian conflict highlights how great powers often repeat strategic patterns:
using peripheral wars to challenge rivals, and economic tools to wear them down.
Then, as now, the goal was not total victory but strategic exhaustion — forcing the adversary into overextension.
However, in the 21st century, economic warfare has replaced ideological confrontation.
Instead of collapsing through oil prices and arms races, powers today risk erosion through sanctions, trade isolation, and technological decoupling.
Ultimately, the lesson of both Afghanistan and Ukraine is clear:
wars of attrition rarely produce winners.
They drain economies, polarize societies, and reshape global balances — leaving every side weaker than before.
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Ukraine war, Soviet–Afghan war, economic warfare, sanctions on Russia, Cold War strategy, Russia war economy, oil prices, Western sanctions, geopolitics, war of attrition, proxy war, NATO strategy, global trade disruption.
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A historical and geopolitical analysis comparing the war in Ukraine with the Soviet–Afghan conflict of the 1980s. How the West’s sanctions and economic pressure on Russia mirror Cold War strategies that once led the USSR toward collapse.