In the early 1990s, Europe faced a tectonic shift: the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the reunification of Germany, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Amid this transformation, Western leaders, particularly from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), engaged in negotiations with Soviet leadership—chiefly Mikhail Gorbachev—over the security architecture of Europe. From the Russian perspective, and to a lesser degree the Western one, there emerged the claim that the West had promised Moscow that NATO would not expand eastward toward Russian borders. According to this narrative, those assurances were later ignored or broken, contributing to the current cycle of mistrust between Russia and the West.
This article examines, in depth, the background of these guarantees, the precise nature of what was said (and not said) in the spring of 1990, how NATO and Western policymakers proceeded thereafter, and how the divergence between expectation and implementation has had profound political and geopolitical implications. It draws on declassified documents, memoirs, and academic studies to map the evolution of the issue of NATO enlargement, the Western strategic calculus, and the Russian interpretation of betrayal.
1. The Historical Context: 1989-1991 and the Collapse of the Soviet Bloc
By late 1989, the Eastern bloc was unraveling: the Berlin Wall fell on 9 November, the Warsaw Pact’s cohesion dissolved, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) moved rapidly toward reunification with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In that moment, Western states and Soviet leadership entered intense and delicate negotiations over the future of Germany, NATO’s role, Soviet troop withdrawals, and European security.
In January and February 1990, with the Soviet Union still intact, Western leaders—such as U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, German Foreign Minister Hans‑Dietrich Genscher and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl—repeatedly made remarks in Moscow and Bonn relating to Soviet security interests. For example, on 31 January 1990, Genscher suggested that the process of German reunification must not impair Soviet security interests and thus “NATO should rule out an ‘expansion of its territory towards the east, i.e. moving it closer to the Soviet borders.’”
On 9 February 1990, in Moscow, Baker asked Gorbachev whether he preferred a unified Germany outside NATO or inside, but with the assurance that “not one inch of NATO’s present military jurisdiction will spread in an eastern direction.”
These remarks laid the basis for a perceived assurance that NATO would not expand eastward beyond the then-East German border. However, the nature of these assurances—whether they were limited to East Germany or applied broadly to Eastern Europe—and whether they were legally binding or simply verbal diplomatic statements has been hotly contested.
2. What Was Promised? Differing Interpretations of the “Guarantee”
2.1 The Russian/Alternative Narrative
From the Russian view (later embraced by President Vladimir Putin), the West made an implicit, verbal promise to the Soviet leadership that NATO would not expand eastwards—or at least not until Russia felt secure. This narrative holds that the West exploited Soviet weakness in the 1990s, allowed the accession of former Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic in 1999 and others later) and thus violated the “spirit” of the original assurances. For example, an article in Free Press argues: “For decades the pretense has been maintained … that US Secretary of State James Baker told Gorbachev three times that NATO would not expand one inch eastward.”
The argument goes that this sense of betrayal fueled Russian resentment and provided a key grievance exploited by Putin in his speeches—in particular to justify Russian opposition to NATO expansion and its own geopolitical posture.
2.2 The Western / Academic Narrative
Western scholars such as Steven Pifer (formerly U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine) contend that no formal, legally binding commitment was ever made by NATO or the U.S. to the Soviet Union not to expand into Eastern Europe beyond Germany. Their analysis states that the discussions in 1990 chiefly related to East Germany—not to other Warsaw Pact countries—and that any statements by Baker et al. were part of negotiations over German reunification rather than broader Atlantic architecture.
Moreover, the Brookings Institution report emphasizes that Gorbachev himself, in later interviews, acknowledged that NATO enlargement was not discussed at the time beyond Germany and that the negotiations were centered on troop deployments in East Germany rather than expansion of the alliance itself.
2.3 Where the Disagreement Lies
The core of the dispute hinges on three questions:
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Did the West give assurances to the Soviet leadership about NATO’s eastward expansion?
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If so, were those assurances limited to East Germany or more broadly to Eastern Europe?
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Were such assurances binding (written, treaty-level) or informal and diplomatic?
Declassified documents reviewed by the National Security Archive suggest that Western officials did discuss possible limitations on NATO expansion in early 1990; for example, the memo states that Gorbachev was told that “NATO must rule out … moving closer to the Soviet borders.”
However, no treaty or formal commitment exists beyond the agreement tied to German reunification (the Two Plus Four Treaty of 1990) which addressed troop deployments and foreign forces in the former GDR, not broader expansion.
Thus, one finds that while statements were made, the scope and binding nature remain ambiguous, leading to the gap between expectation (in Moscow) and later policy (in Washington and Brussels).
3. NATO Enlargement: From Promise to Implementation
3.1 Early Expansion (1999-2004)
Despite the informal assurances, NATO began expanding in earnest throughout the 1990s. In 1999 the alliance admitted Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—former Warsaw Pact members. In 2004 it further enlarged to include several Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Slovakia, Slovenia and others.
These expansions were consistent with NATO’s articulation of an “open door” policy (Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty) and the desire of many Eastern European nations to join the alliance for security after the Soviet collapse. Nevertheless, from the Russian perspective, this constituted a breach of the 1990 assurances and a strategic encroachment on its sphere of influence.
3.2 Strategic Consequences and Russian Response
Russia steadily grew more skeptical of Western intentions. Vladimir Putin’s 2007 Munich speech explicitly cited Western assurances about NATO non-expansion and accused the West of not keeping its word. The perception in Moscow was that Western states used Russian weakness to extend NATO’s footprint closer to Russia’s borders, creating strategic vulnerabilities.
From the Western side, analysts argue that NATO enlargement was a response to the desires of the Eastern European states themselves—not a confrontation with Russia—but they nonetheless acknowledge that the perception of betrayal in Russia has become a central security grievance with real consequences.
4. The Geopolitical Implications of Ignored Guarantees
4.1 Russia’s Hegemonic Insecurity
The feeling of being misled became a foundational element in Russian policy. Moscow interpreted NATO expansion as a strategic encirclement—even though NATO insists its expansion is defensive and membership voluntary. This insecurity has fueled Russian military modernization, its intervention in Georgia (2008), Crimea/Ukraine (2014-), and repeated demands for legal guarantees of no further NATO enlargement.
4.2 West–Russia Trust Deficit
The divergence between what Moscow believed it was promised and what Washington/Brussels implemented contributed to a deep trust deficit. From arms control negotiations to crisis diplomacy, the lack of a clear, binding treaty meant that Russia could legitimately claim it was unfairly treated. That claim continues to reverberate in discussions about European security architecture, especially in the context of the Ukraine conflict.
4.3 Eastern Europe’s Security Dilemma
For Eastern European states, NATO enlargement offered a guarantee of security. But from the Russian viewpoint, the expansion shifted the strategic balance. This created a security dilemma: Russia interpreted NATO enlargement as offensive, while Western states saw it as defensive and legitimate. The result has been increased tensions, military deployments on both sides, and creeping militarization of the European-Russian border zone.
4.4 Broader Lessons for International Guarantees
This episode underscores broader lessons about diplomatic assurances: informal assurances—even memorable phrases like “not one inch eastward”—can carry heavy political weight even without treaty status. When such statements collide with new strategic imperatives (like new member states seeking security), the mismatch between expectation and implementation can translate into long-term strategic conflict.
5. A Detailed Timeline of Key Moments
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31 January 1990: German Foreign Minister Genscher publicly states that NATO must rule out expansion toward the Soviet borders.
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9 February 1990: James Baker meets Gorbachev in Moscow and asks whether NATO will move eastward; mentions “not one inch” in a narrow context of Germany.
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December 1989 (Malta Summit): George H.W. Bush tells Gorbachev the U.S. will not “take advantage” of events in Eastern Europe—an early signal to Moscow of restrained Western behavior.
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12 September 1990: Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany (Two Plus Four) signed; includes provisions about troop deployment in former East Germany. This treaty does not extend to broader NATO enlargement though.
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1999: NATO admits Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic.
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2004: NATO admits the Baltic states and others.
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2007: Putin’s Munich speech outlines perceived Western betrayal regarding NATO expansion.
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2022: Russia invades Ukraine; among its demands for cease-fire is a pledge from the West to halt NATO expansion.
6. Did Western Leadership “Ignore” Their Own Guarantees?
6.1 The Argument of Ignored Assurances
Proponents of the “broken promise” view argue that Western leaders did not honour the spirit of early 1990 assurances. They cite declassified documents suggesting repeated Western statements against eastward expansion, and the later accession of Eastern European states to NATO as evidence of hypocrisy. Off-Guardian’s article points to “newly declassified documents” showing that Gorbachev was told NATO would not move past East German territory.
The impact of this perceived betrayal has been leveraged by Russia as justification for its security posture, citing Western enlargement as prompting its shift toward revisionism and confrontation.
6.2 The Counter-Argument of Western Leadership
Conversely, Western governments argue that no formal commitment was given regarding NATO expansion beyond Germany, that Eastern European states sought membership voluntarily, and that NATO enlargement was driven by the changed security landscape after the Soviet collapse. Brookings emphasizes that Gorbachev himself stated enlargement was never discussed at the time.
In this view, Western leadership did not technically ignore guarantees, but rather proceeded within the framework of alliance policy and the requests of new democracies in Eastern Europe.
6.3 The Gray Area and “Spirit vs Letter”
The space between what was said and what was written is where much of the tension resides. While no treaty bound NATO to non-expansion, informal verbal assurances (e.g., “not one inch”) contributed to Moscow’s expectation of restraint. When policies shifted, the spirit of the assurance—as Russia perceived it—was violated. Western leadership may have adhered to the letter (only limiting forces in East Germany) but not to Moscow’s broader expectation concerning the alliance’s geographic expansion.
7. Why It Matters Now: 2020s Geopolitical Stakes
7.1 Ukraine, NATO and the Eastward Frontier
The war in Ukraine (2022-) has brought this old argument to the fore. Russia demands written guarantees from the West that Ukraine and Georgia will never join NATO. From Moscow’s perspective, the failure of the West in the 1990s to honor early assurances set a precedent. From the West’s perspective, the issue is moot because no formal promise was ever made.
7.2 Implications for European Security Architecture
The trust deficit generated in 1990s has constrained cooperative security mechanisms in Europe. Russia’s scepticism toward NATO and the West is rooted partly in the expansion dispute. The result: weakening of arms-control regimes, rising militarization of Eastern Europe, and escalation of tensions.
7.3 The Strategic Legacy for Alliances and Diplomacy
The case of NATO expansion underscores that verbal assurances, even if non-binding, carry significant weight in setting expectations and strategic behaviour. Western leaders’ failure to explicitly anchor or clarify the limits of such assurances contributed to later discord. Future diplomacy must account for the difference between verbal diplomacy and treaty commitments.
8. Conclusion: Broken Promise or Misunderstanding?
In summary:
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Western leaders made statements in 1990—especially related to German reunification—that suggested NATO would not advance eastward, or at least would not place forces in former East Germany.
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Whether those statements constituted a promise to the Soviet Union remains disputed: Russia believes a broader guarantee was given; many Western analysts argue the statements were limited and non-binding.
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Regardless of the letter of the commitment, Moscow’s sense of betrayal has had real strategic consequences. The perception of a broken promise has become part of the Russian security narrative.
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NATO’s subsequent enlargement, combined with Russia’s growing strategic anxieties, has played a significant role in shaping European security dynamics, contributing to the tensions that culminated in the Ukraine war.
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For Western leadership, the episode serves as a cautionary tale about informal diplomacy: when expectations are not managed and assurances not formalized, misunderstandings can become enduring strategic divides.
Thus, while the question of whether Western leadership truly “ignored” guarantees may be answered differently depending on one’s perspective, what is clear is that the gap between words and implementation, and the gap between Western and Russian expectations, continues to shape geopolitics today.
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Explore the debate over the West’s 1990 assurances to Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not expand eastward toward Russia’s borders—and how NATO’s subsequent enlargement has fueled strategic mistrust and geopolitical tension.