Ukrainian counteroffensive: Myth or reality?

We have been hearing about a Ukrainian counteroffensive in the main mainstream media for over a month. On which everything and the opposite of everything has been written. And about which we have great doubts if only for the fact that it has been heralded to the point of not being credible. This is because in war the surprise effect is decisive and when operations of this kind are blurted out from the rooftops it is only to deceive and mislead the enemy. Or to convince their public opinion of the possibility of a victory for Kiev on the field. Since many parties are starting to ask for the opening of negotiations that will lead to the end of the conflict. As we have written in previous articles, time is against the West. In the sense that the more time passes, the more the war expenses increase (already enormous in themselves) and, at the same time, Moscow gains precious time to bring its military industrial complex to full capacity with all the consequences that this will entail. ‘ in war terms. Time has always been a factor that played against all those who went to war with Russia. Everyone was confident in a rapid military campaign and a decisive victory which, however, never materialised. And once they sank into the Russian quagmire they were destroyed by a war of attrition and annihilation that left them no escape. The situation today is no different from those previously experienced even if propaganda tries to make us believe otherwise. Today, in particular, it seems like we are reliving the German offensive of 1942. The Germans, not yet convinced of the impossibility of winning on the eastern front even though the assault of the previous year had not been decisive, regained the initiative and advanced further. deeper into Soviet territory and reached the Caucasus and Stalingrad. The rest is history. But let’s try to understand what is true and what is false in the much-hyped “Ukrainian counteroffensive”.

UKRAINE COUNTEROFFENSIVE: THE FORCES (AND TECHNOLOGY) IN THE FIELD

First of all, a premise. The success of an offensive military operation is subject to quantitative and qualitative conditions that do not appear to be present today in the Eastern European theater of war. First of all, as already mentioned, the surprise effect. This is one of the essential elements for the success of an offensive operation in any theater of war. And, lacking this, we are already off to a bad start and at a tactical disadvantage since the enemy can deploy all the necessary countermeasures. Another fundamental aspect is the forces in play. It is known that those who attack generally have a higher number of losses than those who defend. Therefore, considering that the Russian army is made up of around 300,000 personnel, it is assumed that the Ukrainian army should have superior human resources but, considering the losses suffered so far (which are estimated to be around 200,000 units) it is unlikely that Kiev has similar resources. And even considering the contribution of mercenary brigades armed and trained by NATO, we do not believe it will be possible to reach a significant strike force capable of penetrating the defenses of the Russian army in eastern Ukraine by the beginning of summer 2023. southern. Another key factor is air coverage. Such a counteroffensive would require adequate air cover. Something that the Ukrainian army does not have at all at this juncture of the ongoing war. The Russians have complete mastery of the Ukrainian sky and this in itself is an element that precludes any possibility of large-scale offensive actions. The absence of air cover is not compensated by the role that the Ukrainian artillery should have had after the deliveries of the HIMARS systems supplied by the United States of America.The operation of these systems, it is known, has been compromised by the activity of Russian electronic warfare systems (jamming) which have almost exhausted their operational capabilities. Furthermore, it appears that the Russians have disabled the Starlink system through which the Kiev army maintained its connection to the internet and the GPS system. This prevents Ukrainian targeting systems from working effectively and precludes the possibility of precisely establishing the coordinates of the positions of the Russian army. Added to all this are the continuous bombings against the logistics and rear areas of the Ukrainian army (from which supplies pass to the troops on the front line) carried out in recent weeks and further intensified in recent days. All this has likely weakened the offensive potential of the Ukrainian army and has, in all likelihood, made it unavailable to face the burden of a major offensive against the Russian army.

UKRAINE COUNTEROFFENSIVE: MYTH OR REALITY?

The Ukrainian counteroffensive seems to us to be just one of the many propaganda slogans aimed at keeping the “morale” of the Ukrainian war machine and Western public opinion high. A way to make people believe that the frenzied sending of weapons and the military presence of the West in Eastern Europe still makes sense. The point is, however, that, given the data in hand, there are no conditions for a large-scale military offensive. At most there could be some sorties by the Kiev army in specific points of the front, the outcome of which, however, appears uncertain. But there is certainly no possibility of regaining Crimea or the territories lost in Donbass. At least to us, given the data in hand, this seems to be the reality. For all the reasons expressed above. This does not refute analyzes which instead strongly support that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will take place and will be decisive in the victory over Moscow’s troops. Everyone has their own point of view. And everyone has their own beliefs. Soon we will know if the latter will be reality or if, instead, it will have been just a myth.

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