In the current geopolitical scenario, an important role is certainly reserved for the German nation. Germany still today represents one of the largest commercial powers in the world and its economic weight, despite the rise of new realities in the global geoeconomic dynamics, is still very important. Its industrial production is still today, in terms of quantity and quality, one of the most relevant in the world. And its finished products are appreciated in every corner of the globe. The German trade surplus remains, to this day, the strength factor of the Teutonic economy (and the true source of Germany’s wealth). Over the last twenty years, a strong boost to German exports has been given by the development of the enormous Chinese market. On which Berlin has shown that it is aiming in a determined and decisive way. This has allowed a constant growth of the Teutonic economy thanks to a strong positioning on what is now the largest and most dynamic market in the world (along with the Indian one). At the same time, Berlin has been busy developing political and infrastructural synergies with Putin’s Russia to secure low-cost raw materials essential for its processing industry. Hence the Northstream 1 and 2 projects. This policy, favored above all by the social democratic leader Schroder, however clashed with the USA’s desire to sever relations between Russia and Germany in order to maintain its dominance on the European continent. Since Berlin’s trade with Moscow and Beijing would have made the latter’s economy dependent on Russia and China to the point of being “politically” bound by them. Today’s geopolitical developments are breaking twenty years of German geopolitics (based, as just written, on positioning in the Chinese market and on the development of economic synergies with the Kremlin for the supply of low-cost raw materials for the German processing industry) . Geopolitics focused on the basic and vital interests of Germany as a leading trading power. In fact, today Berlin has not only had to sever economic relations with Moscow (as a consequence of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine) but also seems to be starting to reduce relations with China. All this on the diktat of the Anglo-Saxon political leadership which is pushing to isolate Germany and the whole of Europe from the global geopolitical context.
THE GEOPOLITICS OF GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
It seems clear that the Germany’s geopolitics is experiencing a period of profound contradictions. In particular, today’s German political leadership seems to have thrown away twenty years of work in which strategic economic partnerships were built for the development and prosperity of the German nation. And it won’t be easy to go back, also considering the developments in the international geopolitical situation. And if the current state of German geopolitical dynamics is perfectly functional to Anglo-Saxon interests, it is completely incompatible with Germany’s economic and geopolitical interests. Even considering the commercial concessions that the Anglo-Saxon establishment seems to have made in Berlin by providing a “preferential lane” for German goods on the US and English markets, it is undeniable that this could represent an immediate “lifesaver” but it does not constitute a remedy for the enormous losses, in terms of outlets on the strategic markets of the future, that Berlin will have to suffer in the years to come. The loss of competitiveness of German products resulting from the lack of low-cost raw materials as well as the closure of the Chinese market could be fatal blows to the growth of the Teutonic economy. And condemn the future of the German people and their well-being. It remains incomprehensible that the German establishment has started towards a path of regression and economic involution which will make Germany’s economic and geopolitical weight much lower already in the near future.Furthermore, active participation in the war in Eastern Europe places Berlin in an awkward position within the internal political dynamics of the European Union. Within which there are heterogeneous visions that are not functional to Germany’s strategic interests. Like the obsessively Russophobic ones in Poland and, in general, in the states of Eastern Europe who continue to call for war when in Berlin they would prefer a truce and a lasting peace capable of preventing war expenses from exhausting the country’s monetary reserves (deriving from the German trade balance surplus). On the other hand, if the war were to continue for a long time, Germany will be forced to increase military spending with a consequent burden on its public finances. It is clear that the war in Ukraine represents a real geopolitical trap for Berlin. A trap hatched by the Anglo-Saxon establishment and from which the German political leadership does not seem to be able to escape.